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I. INTRODUCTION: A FAMILY FEUD
In 1872, a young man named Claudio Alvarez Lefebre began
manufacturing and selling high-quality rum in Cuba under the brand
name "Ron Matusalem."I In 1948, as the family-run business prospered,
the company registered a trademark and corporate logo in the United
States. 2 Upon his death, Lefebre left the business-and the secret
formulas for making his rum-to his wife and children. By the early
1960s, Lefebre's wife and children had immigrated to the United States,
and they split the rum-making business into two separate
corporations. 3 These two distinct entities negotiated an executory
contract 4 in the form of a franchise agreement with a trademark license .
This agreement granted the franchisee corporation the right to sell Ron
Matusalem rums worldwide under the Ron Matusalem trademark. 5 The
franchisor corporation retained the right to control the nature and
quality of the rums sold and the right to terminate the agreement if the
franchisee failed to meet its standards.6 For the next two decades, the
two corporations operated as a cohesive family business, or, as a court
described them, a "loose knit strada of corporations."7
1. In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id. An executory contract is one that is wholly or partially unperformed on both sides.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
5. In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. at 517.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 518 (detailing the opinion of the district court).
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However, in late 1981, a family "squabble" emerged, and the
leadership of the two corporations ceased cooperating.8 Years of
"litigation for litigation's sake" followed the quarrel.9 Ten years later,
the franchisor corporation filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding. Unlike a typical Chapter 11 reorganization, this
bankruptcy petition was not to reorganize and revitalize the
corporation. Instead, the franchisor asked the court to reject the
trademark license and end the franchisee's rights to the Ron
Matusalem trademark. The franchisor had discovered a strategic path
for ending the family squabble: pushing the franchisee out of the
business entirely.10
When a trustee or debtor-in-possession rejects an executory
contract involving trademark rights, courts have two potential
approaches for determining who retains the right to use the
trademark." One approach terminates the licensee's right, only
providing the licensee with the opportunity to sue for rejection
damages. 12 The other approach grants the licensee continued use of the
trademark rights under the theory that rejection is not rescission but
instead is a contract breach whereby the nonbreaching party's rights
remain in place. 13 Without a controlling Supreme Court opinion on
point, differing approaches create confusion as courts struggle to
balance intellectual property rights with the contractual rights of
licensees.
Part II of this Note examines relevant sections of
11 U.S.C. § 365, subsequent amendments under the Intellectual
Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act ("IPLBA"), and theoretical
interpretations and definitions of what "rejection" means within the
context of bankruptcy law. Part III analyzes the circuit split, discussing
the merits and weaknesses of each approach. Part IV suggests that the
Supreme Court resolve the circuit split by adopting a modified version
8. Id.
9. Id. at 517 18.
10. See id. at 520 ("The principal purpose of the Chapter 11 is to cause the rejection of Inc.'s
franchise agreement ... filed on December 10, 1992."). The court found that the filing was not an
effort at reorganization but was rather a "vendetta." Id.
11. Compare Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376 78 (7th Cir.
2012) (holding rejection as separate from rescission, thus leaving trademark licensee rights in
place), with Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir.
1985) (finding that the only remedy is rejection damages, and not the retention of contract rights
through specific performance).
12. See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 (determining that licensees could not continue to use the
intellectual property upon rejection).
13. See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376-78 (holding that as the non-breaching party, the
trademark licensee's rights remained in place).
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of the Seventh and Third Circuits' approach, but adding the
requirement that trademark licensees maintain the quality control
standards initially contained in the parties' original licensing
agreement.
II. BACKGROUND: 11 U.S.C. § 365, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCIES, AND THE 11 U.S.C. § 365(N) ISSUE
Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a trustee in
bankruptcy may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor. 14 Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define
"rejection" or "executory contract," the meaning of these terms requires
further examination. Although the codification of the Intellectual
Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act15 provides protections for
licensees, it does not protect trademark licensees because trademarks
are not included in the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "intellectual
property."16 However, a court may still grant a trademark licensee
continued use of a trademark by treating a trustee's rejection as a
"breach" of an executory contract. 17
A. Regulating Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)
After filing a bankruptcy petition, the trustee or executor of the
bankrupt estate may need to liquidate assets to raise capital needed to
satisfy creditors.18 Some situations require shedding contracts that
were binding on the prepetition estate, whether to free up assets for
sale or to prevent impairment of the postpetition entity.19 Trustees
must collect and liquidate property of the estate as quickly as possible,
which requires the expeditious resolution of prepetition license
agreements, a type of executory contract. 20 Bankruptcy trustees facing
this dilemma can find a solution in 11 U.S.C. § 365, which regulates
executory contracts and unexpired leases in bankruptcy. 2 1
14. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).
15. Id. § 365(n).
16. Id. § 101(35A).
17. Id. § 365(g).
18. See, e.g., Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 374 (providing an example of a trustee's need to sell or
liquidate assets of the bankrupt estate in order to satisfy creditors).
19. See id. In Sunbeam, the asset at issue was the use of Lakewood's trademark on boxed
fans. The trustee decided to sell the "Lakewood" trademark to Jarden Consumer Solutions, but
needed to resolve a trademark license with Chicago American Manufacturing (CAM).
20. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *13-14, Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC,
133 S. Ct. 790 (2012) (No. 12-431).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 365.
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Section 365(a) provides: "In subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section,
the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."22 Despite the
importance of this section, the Bankruptcy Code leaves "executory
contract" undefined, forcing courts to resort to extrinsic evidence of its
meanrng.
1. Providing a Functional Definition of "Executory Contract" Under
11 U.S.C. § 365
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define "executory
contract" as used in § 365(a), 23 the Code's legislative history provide s
guidance. 24 Statements made in the House of Representatives suggest
that Congress intended "executory contract" to refer to a contract in
which "performance is due to some extent on both sides." 2 5 Most courts
have adopted legal scholar Vern Countryman's definition of "executory
contract," which narrows the House's definition. 26 Under this definition,
the obligations of both the debtor and the other party must be so far
unperformed that the failure of either party to complete performance
would entail a "material breach," thereby excusing the other party's
performance.27
Like other intellectual property licenses, most trademark
licenses are executory contracts. 28 Trademark licenses generally
exchange rights for royalty payments, thus creating continuing
22. Id. § 365(a).
23. Id.; In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3rd Cir. 2010).
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963.
Legislative history suggests that while there is "no precise definition of what contracts are
executory, [the term] generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some
extent on both sides." Id.
25. See In re Colombia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3rd Cir. 1995) (noting that
Countryman's definition is narrow and that under Congress's definition, almost any contract can
be considered an executory contract).
26. In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 962; see 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III,
NORTON BANKRUPTCYLAW & PRACTICE § 46:6 (3d ed. 2008) (detailing the now-prevailing standard
for determining an executory contract, Countryman's definition: "a contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other" (citation omitted)); see also Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 450 (1973) (providing an expanded and functional
definition of executory contracts used by many courts).
27. Countryman, supra note 26, at 450.
28. Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin & Ted A. Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The
Comprehensive Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 5
(2013) (discussing when patent, copyright, or trademark licenses are executory contracts and
deducing that "IP licenses are almost always viewed as executory contracts unless the license is
an assignment or one side has completely performed its obligations").
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obligations between the parties. 29 In exchange for royalties, a license
contractually prevents the licensor from suing the licensee for its use of
the trademark. 30
2. The Problem with "Naked Licenses"
Licenses commonly obligate the licensee to maintain the
licensor's quality control standards for products marketed under the
trademark. 31 These provisions protect the licensor from judicial
forfeiture of its legal rights in those symbols. 32 A "naked license" does
not include such control provisions. 33 Courts may interpret naked
licenses as a signal that the trademark owner has abandoned the
trademark. 34 More significantly, naked licenses might mislead the
public. 35 Trademarks are often valuable specifically because of the
goodwill they provide; thus, they are also implicit guarantees of
quality. 36 A licensor's failure to control the quality of the goods or
services produced by the licensee defrauds the public. 37 For these
reasons, naked licenses should be avoided if possible.
3. The Business Judgment Test and Granting Rejection
Because a trustee or debtor-in-possession must both maximize
value to the estate and reduce obligations to creditors, most seek to
reject disadvantageous executory contracts or unexpired leases once a
bankruptcy petition has been filed. Under § 365(a), rejection of
29. See id. at 9-10:
[B]oth parties to the license agreement have ongoing obligations, were this not the case,
the trademark would be invalidated for lack of quality control. The licensor has the
continuing statutory obligation to monitor the quality of the trademark, notify licensees
of any infringements, enforce the trademark for the benefit of the licensee, and
indemnify the licensee for any damages, expenses and attorney's fees. The licensee has
the continuing obligation to adhere to the licensor's quality control . . . pay for the
use .. , and to market the trademark.
30. Id. at 5 ("At a fundamental level, the grant of a license is intended to be a continuing
obligation not to sue the licensee making any license executory."). For the sake of simplicity
"licensee" is synonymous with franchisee when discussing trademarks in bankruptcy.
31. Timothy W. Gordon, Tenth Circuit Survey: Intellectual Property, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 829,
837 (1996) ("The trademark owner, however, must ensure that the licensee maintains the quality
of goods bearing the trademark.").
32. JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 11.03 (1994).
33. Id.
34. Gordon, supra note 31, at 837.
35. Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978) ("The purpose of [the
adequate control] requirement is to protect the public from being misled.").
36. Kevin Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the "Quality
Control Requirement" in §Jademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 533 (1992).
37. Gordon, supra note 31, at 837 n.80.
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executory contracts or unexpired leases requires court approval. 38
Courts frequently grant deference to the trustee's request to reject an
executory contract.39 The Bankruptcy Code focuses on rehabilitating
the debtor's estate, and courts recognize that the trustee or debtor-in-
possession is usually in the best position to determine whether an
executory contract will enhance or detract from the value of the estate. 40
Accordingly, courts apply the business judgment test to evaluate
whether a proposed rejection warrants approval.41 Under this test, the
court denies the request to reject an executory contract or unexpired
lease only if the rejection detrimentally affects the estate or has an
improper purpose. 42 A minority of courts use a balancing test, weighing
the asserted benefit to the bankruptcy estate against the impact on the
other party, to determine whether to grant rejection. 43 However, the
majority version of the business judgment test considers only the needs
of the bankrupt debtor's estate.44 Because the test focuses on the
38. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).
39. See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy §Jeatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 733, 769 (2007) (characterizing the attitude of the Bankruptcy
Code as "generally permissive").
40. See Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 34 ("The ability to reject executory contracts is one
of the most powerful rights afforded to a debtor in bankruptcy and generally aids greatly in the
debtor's successful reorganization.").
41. See, e.g., Grp. of Institutional Investors v. Chi, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 318
U.S. 523, 550 (1943) ("The question whether a lease should be rejected and, if not, on what terms
it shouldbe assumed is one of business judgment."); In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 3.R. 798, 800 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1982) ("We believe the'business judgment' rule is the standard which controls the court's
right to disapprove the trustee's decision to reject an executory contract."); In re HurricaneElkhorn
Coal Corp. II, 15 B.R. 987, 989 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) ("The rigidityof the burdensome test makes
its use unappealing. . . . [I]n light of the Supreme Court's reliance on the business judgment
test . . . we think the business judgment rule to be the preferable standard.").
42. For an example of a detrimental effect on an estate, see In re Midwest Polychem, Ltd.,
61 B.R. 559, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (denying rejection because it would make no business or
equitable sense); see also In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936, 940-41 (11th Cir. 1986) (determining that
the debtor exercised rejection in bad faith); Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 35 (providing several
further authorities).
43. See, e.g., In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that
rejection would provide little to no benefit to the debtor, while strongly damaging the licensee's
business).
44. See generally Warren E. Agin, Here Today and Gone Tomorrow: Section 365 and the
Unfortunate Intellectual Property Licensee, ANDREWS BANKR. LITIG. REP., Aug. 27, 2004, at 4
(discussing the disadvantages bankruptcy law presents for licensees, because the focus of
bankruptcy law is rehabilitation of the bankrupt estate).
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estate's rehabilitation, 4 5  courts grant rejection liberally, often
inadvertently harming intellectual property licensees. 46
4. Theoretical Interpretations of "Rejection"
What does the "rejection" of an executory contract actually
entail? Does rejection require the courts to place the debtor-licensor and
the solvent licensee in the positions they occupied before the license
agreement? Common law provides the answer: no. 4 7 In Thompkins v.
Lil' Joe Records, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit determined that rejection of
an executory contract was not the functional equivalent of rescission.48
Upon rejection, the parties do not need to be returned back to their
precontract positions. 49  Rejection under § 365 "does not
embody . . . contract-vaporizing properties. . . . Rejection merely frees
the estate from the obligation to perform; it does not make the contract
disappear."50 Scholarly opinions echo the Eleventh Circuit's finding in
Thompkins, theorizing that rejection as defined in § 365(a) is
synonymous with "not assume."5 1 By not assuming the executory
contract, the estate renounces future obligations of, and rights to,
specific performance. However, the licensee's continuing rights are fully
enforceable.52
45. See Local Loan Co.v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) ("[Bankruptcy] gives to the honest
but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.") (emphasis added).
46. Agin, supra note 44, at 4.
47. See Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing
how executory contract rejection under § 365 is not equivalent to a rescission); see also, 2 NORTON,
supra note 26, § 46:57 ("The Bankruptcy Code instructs us that rejection is a breach of the
executory contract. It is not avoidance, rescission, or termination."); Michael T. Andrew, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 'Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 916 (1988)
("[R]ejection is not a rescission of the license or franchise, but merely that estate's determination
not to assume it.").
48. 476 F.3d at 1306.
49. Id. (finding no authority requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they
occupied before the contract was formed).
50. Id. (citingln re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2000)).
51. See Andrew, supra note 47, at 848-49 (suggesting rejection is nothing more than the
label for the decision not to assume).
52. Id. at 932 ("The confusion surrounding rejection has led, though, to the mistaken view
that rejection of an 'executory' contract somehow abates or alters contract liabilities, thereby
diminishing the non-debtor's rights.").
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B. Codification of the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act:
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)
In 1988, Congress passed the Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act to prevent debtor-licensors from abusing judicial
rejection to strip licensees of contractual, bargained-for rights.53 The
IPLBA directly responded to the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Lubrizol
Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., which prioritized a
debtor-licensor's rejection rights over a licensee's intellectual property
rights and chilled intellectual property development. 54 Under Lubrizol,
licensees of intellectual property lost their rights to use the intellectual
property after the debtor-licensor rejected the executory contract in
bankruptcy.55 After Lubrizol, almost any license could be invalidated by
the licensor's decision to file for bankruptcy.56
Intellectual property, high technology, and investor
communities fiercely denounced the Lubrizol framework.5 7 The U.S.
Department of Commerce concluded that Lubrizol would preclude
significant investment in technologies that required licensing.58
Answering the outcry, Congress enacted IPLBA to prevent bankrupt
licensors from depriving licensees of irreplaceable intellectual property
rights.59 Codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), IPLBA strengthened the rights
of intellectual property licensees.60
Section 365(n) provides intellectual property licensees with
additional rights when a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession
53. John P. Musone, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act: A
Proposed Solution to Achieve Congress'Intent, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 509-10 (1997).
54. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir.
1985) ("Nor can it be doubted that allowing rejection in this and comparable cases could have a
general chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at all with businesses in
possible financial difficulty."); Musone, supra note 53, at 512 (detailing how Congress passed
IPLBA with the express intent of reversing Lubrizol).
55. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
56. Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227,
307 (1989).
57. Menell, supra note 39, at 770.
58. Id.
59. S. 1626, 100th Cong., 133 CONG. REC. Si, 654-55 (1987); see Andrew, supra note 47, at
919 (providing details of IPLBA, introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini with the expressed
purpose of "deny[ing] bankrupt licensors the ability to deprive licensees of irreplaceable
intellectual property . . . by providing protections similar to those offered in real estate sales
agreements and leases"); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-1012, at 6 (1988) (noting that Lubrizol had "a
chilling effect on licenses of intellectual property and that businesses are becoming reluctant to
rely on licensed technology knowing that the license could be taken away if the licensor files
bankruptcy. Licensees sometimes use the licensed technology as the basis for an entire business.").
60. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012).
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rejects the license agreement.6 1 The key provision of § 365(n) is the right
of the "licensee under such contract to . . . retain its rights . . . to such
intellectual property . . as such rights existed immediately before the
case commenced."62 These rights include continued use of the
intellectual property for the duration of the license agreement,
extending any applicable period under nonbankruptcy law. 63
Additionally, the licensee is given the ability to enforce exclusivity
provisions against the debtor-licensor. 6 4
However, under § 365(n) a licensee does not retain all of his or
her original rights under the license.65 Rather, the debtor and his or her
successors obtain reprieve from some continuing obligations under the
license.66 Although the license's "affirmative performance" obligations
no longer bind the debtor, passive obligations, such as not licensing the
technology to others if the original license contained an exclusivity
clause, still constrain the debtor's choices.6 7
C. Obstacles to Trademark Protection Under § 365: The Statutory
Definition of 'Intellectual Property" Under the Bankruptcy Code
As it is used in 11 U.S.C. § 365(n), the term "intellectual
property" does not include trademarks and related forms of protection
(i.e., trade dress). 6 8 Section 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy Code defines
"intellectual property":
(35A) "intellectual property" means-
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35;
(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;
61. Menell, supra note 39, at 772.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B).
63. Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 35.
64. Id.
65. See Menell, supra note 39, at 772 ("Congress did not, however, simply override the
licensor's power to reject IF licensing agreements. Rather, it carefully crafted the mechanics and
rights structure under section 365(n) to satisfy . . . intellectual property licensees . . . while
shielding debtor-licensors from any additional burdens associated with the license.").
66. Id.
67. See id. (detailing the affirmative and negative duties debtors face upon rejection); see
also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 9 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206-07; Gilhuly et al.,
supra note 26, at 38 ("Congress distinguished between the debtor-licensor's 'passive obligations'
and 'affirmative performance.'").
68. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012).
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(E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17 to the extent
protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.6 9
Legislative history indicates that Congress intentionally
omitted trademarks from "intellectual property" when it
enacted § 365(n). 70 Congress found that such contracts were "beyond the
scope of [the] legislation. . . . [T]rademark . . . relationships depend to a
large extent on control of the quality of the products or services sold by
the licensee . . . . [I]t was determined to postpone congressional action
in this area and to allow the development of equitable treatment . .. by
bankruptcy courts."71
Differences between the nature of trademark laws and that of
patent and copyright laws may support differential treatment by
Congress and explain the absence of trademark rights in
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 72 First, trademarks indicate the source of goods
and services and cannot be sold or assigned apart from the goods they
symbolize. 73 Second, while patents and copyrights are property rights
of limited duration, trademarks derive from marketplace use, evolve
over time, and can last indefinitely. 74 The durational differences
between copyrights, patents, and trademarks may justify differential
treatment.75 Finally, the underlying goals of the protections are
different. Patent and copyright protection focuses on promoting
innovation76 while trademark protection derives from the "need to
ensure the integrity of the marketplace, and to prevent consumer
confusion as to the source of goods."77
69. Id.
70. S. REP NO. 100-505, at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 3204; Gilhuly et al., supra
note 28, at 45 ("The exclusion of trademarks from the Bankruptcy Code's definition of IP appears
to be intentional.").
71. Id.
72. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A); see Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 32 (explaining differences
between patent, copyright, and trademark laws).
73. Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 32.
74. James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, §ademark Licensing in the Shadow of
Bankruptcy, 68 BUS. LAW. 739, 757 (2013) (discussing the fundamental differences between the
nature of trademark, patent, and copyright rights).
75. See id. (providing an example of how the long-term nature of many trademark licenses
leads to difficulties in amending the contracts in anticipation of contract renewal, thus posing
constraints on licensors in ways that can harm a licensor's business's viability).
76. Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 32.
77. Id.
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D. Treating Rejection of an Executory Contract as a Breach of
Contract: 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)
The Code also provides § 365(g) to assist the court in
determining the rights of both licensees and debtors upon the rejection
of an executory contract.78 The essential language within this section
states, "[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease."79 In
applying § 365(g) to trademark licensees and assigning trademark
rights after rejection, courts consider law on breach from both
bankruptcy and other areas of law.8 0 If one party breaches a contract
the nonbreaching party's rights do not changeS" In Thompkins v. Lil'
Joe Records, Inc., the plaintiff argued that rejection under § 365(g)
required contract dissolution that would return the parties to their
precontract positions. 82 In denying the plaintiffs argument for contract
rescission, the court decided that rejection under § 365(g) had "no effect
upon the contract's continued existence . . . rejection merely frees the
estate from the obligation to perform." 83 Under § 365(g), the trustee's
rejection operates as the debtor's estate breaching the contract; the
licensee's right to continued use of the intellectual property is
unaffected. 84
III. ANALYSIS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND
THE SEVENTH AND THIRD CIRCUITS
Because the Bankruptcy Code definition of "intellectual
property" does not include trademarks, courts disagree over whether
protections for intellectual property licensees under § 365(n) should
nevertheless extend to trademark licensees. 85 This disagreement has
created a circuit split between the Fourth Circuit on the one hand and
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2012).
79. Id. (emphasis added), see 2 NORTON, supra note 6, § 46:57 ("The Bankruptcy Code
instructs us that rejection is a breach of the executory contract. It is not avoidance, rescission, or
termination.").
80. See e.g., Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012)
("[W]hat § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as outside
of it, the other party's rights remain in place.").
81. Id.
82. Thompkins v. Lil' Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007).
83. Id.
84. See id. Although Thompkins did not deal with trademarks, the reasoning of
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) can be applied to trademark license agreements.
85. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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the Seventh and Third Circuits on the other.86 Under the Fourth
Circuit's approach in Lubrizol, a trademark licensee cannot continue to
use the trademark license once the debtor-licensor's trustee rejects the
license in bankruptcy.87 This directly opposes the Seventh and Third
Circuits' approach in Sunbeam and In re Exide.88 Under this approach,
the trustee's rejection of the executory contract constitutes a breach of
contract.89 As a result, the nonbreaching party, here the licensee, is
entitled to his or her rights under the contract as they existed
immediately before the breach, which may include the right to the
continued use of the trademark.90
A. Fourth Circuit Approach in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond
Metal Finishers: No Postrejection Use of the Trademark by the
Licensee
The Fourth Circuit first articulated its position in Lubrizol
Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, a case involving a patent
license.91 In 1982, Richmond Metal Finishers ("RMF") and Lubrizol
entered into a contract that granted Lubrizol a nonexclusive license to
use a metal coating process developed and owned by RMF. 92 The court
determined that the agreement was an executory contract. 93 In
exchange for the license, Lubrizol owed RMF royalties for use of the
process, while RMF had the continuing duty to notify Lubrizol of any
patent infringement suits. RMF also agreed to consider renegotiating
royalty rates if new licenses were granted to other parties at lower
rates. 9 4 RMF filed for Chapter 11 a year later and sought to reject the
contract under § 365(a). 95 The bankruptcy court approved the rejection,
finding that it did notviolate the business judgment rule. 96 By accepting
the bankruptcy court's application of the business judgment test, the
Fourth Circuit denied Lubrizol the right to retain its contractual right
86. Id.
87. See generally Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043
(4th Cir. 1985) (providing the basis for most district court opinions terminating the rights of
licensees to use trademark rights upon rejection by the debtor's trustee).
88. See supra note 19 (providing the holding from Sunbeam).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
92. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012), Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045.
96. Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047.
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to use the technology and limited Lubrizol's claim to damages for the
rejection .9
Several lower courts have adopted Lubrizol's reasoning and
provided further justifications for denying trademark licensees the
continued right to use the trademark postrejection.98 For example, one
bankruptcy court demonstrated a strict textualist interpretation
of § 365 in an analysis that closely mirrored Lubrizol. When
determining trademark rights in a software dispute, the court in In re
Centura determined that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)
excluded trademarks from the definition of "intellectual property."
Because it was "inappropriate to resort to legislative history when the
statute is clear," the court denied the licensee continuing rights.99 Other
cases have supported the Fourth Circuit's finding that damages are the
only remedy authorized under § 365(g)(1) for licensees after rejection. 100
This effectively denies licensees a specific performance remedy that
would allow postrejection use of the trademark.101
Some lower courts have applied Lubrizol to deny licensees
continued trademark rights under the license but have granted a
"phase out period."102 During the "phase out," or transition period, the
licensee is temporarily granted the right to continued use of the
trademark for a defined period. Although there is no statutory authority
for transition periods, courts have granted them in at least two
instanceS. 103 However, the length of the phase out periods varied
97. Id. at 1048:
Lubrizol would be entitled to treat rejection as a breach and seek a money damages
remedy; however, it could not seek to retain its contract rights in the technology by
specific performance even if that remedy would ordinarilybe available upon breach of
this type of contract. . . . [T]he purpose of [365(g)] is to provide only a damages remedy
for the non-bankrupt party.
98. See, e.g., In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (suggesting that
trademarks are not "intellectual property" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, rejection by
a licensor deprives a licensee of the right to use a trademark); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290
B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) ("[U]pon the rejection of a trademark license, Lubrizol's harsh
holding controls, and the licensee is left with only a claim for breach."); see also In re Blackstone
Potato Chip Co., 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I 1990) (holding that the license and/or trade name
is transferred back to the debtor post-rejection).
99. 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002). The statute is clear in that 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) and
11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) have no textual reference to trademark rights.
100. See, e.g., In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (limiting the
licensee to a damages claim resulting from the debtor's breach of contract under
11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1)).
101. See id. (providing no mention of a claim for allowing a licensee continued use of the
trademark).
102. See HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 514 (providing licensees with a phase out period
during which they must remove all of the debtor's trademarks).
103. See In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222, 250 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (providing a two-year
transition period); HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 514 (providing a thirty-day transition period).
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widely; in one case, the court granted the licensee thirty days, while
another court granted the licensee two years. 104 Although a phase out
period may seem to be a viable solution to the circuit split, without any
statutory authorization of phase out periods, widespread adoption is
unlikely.105
The Fourth Circuit's approach has several benefits. First, the
Fourth Circuit's approach maximizes the ability of trustees and
debtors-in-possession to "collect and reduce to money the property of
the estate for which such trustee serves, as expeditiously as is
compatible."10 6 In some cases, the bankruptcy trustee will attempt to
reject the trademark license for the express purpose of liquidizing the
trademark through an auction or sale. 107 By denying trademark
licensees continued use of the trademark after rejection, the Fourth
Circuit's approach emphasizes finality between licensor and licensee. 108
Additionally, it aids the expeditious liquidation of an estate's
trademark assets by creating certainty in the rights of both parties and
the value of the trademark rights to be sold.109
Second, the Fourth Circuit's approach better maintains the
integrity of trademark rights.110 Rejection relieves the debtor of all
future obligations, including the continuing obligation to monitor and
assure quality control over the trademarked goods.' Granting
trademark licensees continued use of the trademark without quality
control by the debtor-licensor jeopardizes the quality of the
trademark. 112 Without oversight by the licensor, the licensee can
104. In re Exide, 340 B.R. at 250; HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 514.
105. Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 48.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2012); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at *13-14.
107. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at *13-14 (detailing circumstances in
which a bankruptcy trustee may need to sell intellectual property for the benefit of the estate and
creditors, and discussing the difficulty of doing so under the Seventh Circuit's approach).
108. See id. (describing how, under the Fourth Circuit's ruling, the value of the trademark
will be certain for bidders at an auction).
109. Id. ("[T]he inter-circuit conflict creates substantial uncertainty regarding what rights a
purchaser in bankruptcy is acquiring from the bankruptcy estate.").
110. See id. at 12-13 ("[The Seventh Circuit's opinion] threatens to undermine the integrity
of trademark rights. . . . As a result, a licensee can subsequently affix the trademark to products
without fear of liability, thus weakening the inherent value of the trademark and harming
consumers who rely on the trademark.").
111. See Menell,supra note 39, at 772 (suggesting that affirmative obligations requiring action
from the debtor's estate are discharged after rejection); see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 9 (1988),
reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206-07; Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 38 ("Congress
distinguished between the debtor-licensor's 'passive obligations' and 'affirmative performance.' ");
Richard Lieb, The Interrelationship of §ademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J.
1, 36-37 (1990) ("Rejection does not itself operate to rescind the executory contract ab initio, but
merely serves to terminate it with respect to the debtor's obligations for future performance.").
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 20, at 12-13.
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"subsequently affix the trademark to products without fear of liability,
thus weakening the inherent value of the trademark and harming
consumers who rely on the trademark." 113 Some scholars suggest that
allowing licensees continued use of the trademark postrejection would
be equivalent to the abandonment of the trademark and lead to the
destruction of the brand. 114
On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit's approach also evinces
several weaknesses. First, as the Lubrizol court noted, terminating a
licensee's continuing rights to postrejection trademark use could chill
the willingness of parties to contract with businesses during times of
financial difficulty.115 Congress responded to Lubrizol's harsh holding
by passing § 365(n) but failed to solve this essential problem with
respect to businesses using trademark licenses. By omitting
trademarks from the 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) definition of intellectual
property, the general chilling effect still applies to businesses that use
trademark licenses.116
Second, the Fourth Circuit's approach conflicts with the
fundamental rights of parties under contract law. Lubrizol allows
licensors to revoke trademarked rights that were once the subject of
negotiated agreements between the licensor and licensee.1 17 This allows
debtor-licensors to use the bankruptcy process as a "sword . . . [not] a
shield, putting them in a catbird seat they often do not deserve."11 8 The
In re Matusalem court recognized this danger when the licensor
explicitly used a Chapter 11 filing to reject a trademark license
agreement. 119 The court denied the licensor the right to reject the
license agreement, citing a violation of the business judgment rule and
113. Id.
114. Wilton & Devore, supra note 74, at 774:
[W]hat would be the result? In the Chapter 11 case of franchisor-licensor of anational
brand ... how would trademark quality and consistencybe maintained without specific
enforcement of the rejected franchise agreements against the debtor-licensor? If so,
would license rejection not equate with abandonment of the trademark and destruction
of the brand?"
115. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir.
1985) ("Nor can it be doubted that allowing rejection in this and comparable cases could have a
general chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at all with businesses in
possible financial difficulty.").
116. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012); id. § 101(35A); Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
117. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 967 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J, concurring) ("They
should not-as occurred in this case-use it to let a licensor take back trademark rights it
bargained away.").
118. Id. at 967-68; see Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting §ademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1267, 1302 (2004) (suggesting that a franchisor or licensor could use the threat of rejection
to force the licensee into a new license agreement containing terms more favorable to the
franchisor or licensor).
119. In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
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determining that "this is not an effort at reorganization but a
vendetta."120 Specifically, the court equated the use of Chapter 11 filings
whose sole purpose is to rescind a trademark license with a bad faith
effort akin to "taking another bite at [the] apple."12 1
Another weakness emerges when modern business practices are
examined. In In re Centura, the court determined that the licensee
could not affix the licensor's trademark to the brand-name product
postrejection; however, the licensee's other intellectual property rights
to continue to sell and manufacture the product-here, software-were
still protected under § 365(n). 122 This example illustrates how
trademark rights can be closely related to other protected intellectual
property rights-such as copyright or patent rights-under § 365(n). In
many instances it makes little sense to sever the interrelationship
between licensed intellectual property rights of different varieties. 123
Modern business practice frequently relies on the simultaneous use and
licensing of multiple forms of intellectual property. 12 4 The right to sell
and use a copyrighted product may be of little value if that product
cannot be sold under an established trademark. Thus, it may make
little practical sense to exclude trademarks yet protect other
intellectual property rights. 125 Thus, § 365 stands in tension with
modern business practices. 126
B. The Seventh and Third Circuits' Approach: Sunbeam Products and
In re Exide
The Seventh and Third Circuits' approach originated in
Sunbeam Products Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC and
120. Id. at 522 ("[I]f the Debtor's conception of § 365(n) were implemented, the proposed
rejection would utterly destroy the business of Inc. and with it the livelihood of Inc.'s principals
and employees.").
121. Id. ("The debtor hopes to accomplish under the Bankruptcy Code what the District Court,
Court of Appeals and the State Court would not permit.").
122. In re Centura Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 669 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding it
undisputed that Raima UK still retained its § 365(n) rights to sell and market the Raima
Software).
123. Nguyen, supra note 118, at 1309-10.
124. Id.
125. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory
oflatellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's approach
towards intellectual property has been based on an "insular view" of intellectual property whereby
IP is divided into three subfields, trademarks, patents and copyrights, whereas, by contrast, real-
world businesses combine these three different subfields to increase their competitive advantage
over rivals).
126. See id. It makes little sense to protect licensees of patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
but to cut off those protections for trademarks, when all three are commonly used in combination.
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In re Exide respectively. 12 7  In Sunbeam, Lakewood Engineering
(Lakewood) contracted with Chicago American Manufacturing ("CAM')
to produce box fans. 128 Under the license agreement, CAM had the right
to place the Lakewood trademarks on completed box fans.129 Due to
financial difficulties, several of Lakewood's creditors brought an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against Lakewood in 2009, a year after
CAM made the agreement. 130 Lakewood's trustee determined that the
best course of action was to sell the business, and, in furtherance of that
goal, the trustee rejected the license with CAM. 131 Sunbeam Products
("Sunbeam") purchased Lakewood's assets, including Lakewood's
patents and trademarks. 132 When CAM continued to sell Lakewood-
branded fans directly in competition with Sunbeam, 133 Sunbeam filed
suit seeking the determination that CAM could no longer sell
Lakewood-branded fans postrejection. 1 34 The bankruptcy court found in
favor of CAM, holding that § 365(n) extends to trademarks "on equitable
grounds."135
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's holding on
a different legal theory. 136 Rather than affirming on equitable grounds,
the Seventh Circuit focused on 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), 13 7 which specifically
refers to rejection of an executory contract as a "breach" of such
contract. 138 Based on this language, the Seventh Circuit determined
that in and outside of bankruptcy law, upon a breach, the nonbreaching
party's rights remain in place. 13 9 Under the Seventh Circuit's reasoning,
rejecting an executory contract is not equivalent to a "rescission" by
127. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012); In re
Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 963-64 (3rd Cir. 2010).
128. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 374.
129. Id.
130. Id. A trustee's ability to reject license agreements or unexpired leases under
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) does not depend on whether the bankruptcy proceeding was voluntary or
involuntary. Courts will use the business judgment test in either situation.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 375.
135. Id.
136. Id. (finding that "what the Bankruptcy Code provides, a judge cannot override by
declaring the enforcement would be 'inequitable' . . . there are hundreds of bankruptcy judges, who
have many different ideas about what is equitable in any given situation").
137. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2012); see Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376 ("[R]ejection . . . constitutes a
breach of such contract.").
138. § 365(g).
139. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376 ("What § 365(g) does by classifyingrejection as a breach is
establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party's rights remain in place.").
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which the parties are placed back in their precontract positions. 140 This
treatment is similar to that of lessors and lessees of real property. If a
lessor enters bankruptcy, the lessor cannot end a tenant's right to
possession, even if the lessor rejects the lease. 141 Thus, under the
Seventh Circuit's approach, trademark licensees receive continued use
of the trademark postrejection because their prepetition rights to use
the trademark survive rejection.142
Judge Ambro's concurrence in In re Exide embodies the Third
Circuit's similar position. 143 In re Exide involved a battery company
("Exide") that licensed the "Exide" trademark to EnerSys, another
company in the industrial battery business. 144 The license was
perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free, reflecting Exide's desire to exit
the battery business. 145 However, a few years later, Exide wanted to
return to the North American battery market and sought to regain the
trademark from EnerSys. 146 Exide filed for Chapter 11 and attempted
to regain the trademark by rejecting the licensing agreement. The
Bankruptcy Court held in favor of Exide and denied EnerSys the
continued use of the trademark. 147 The Third Circuit reversed, finding
that because EnerSys had no continuing obligations, the contract was
not of an executory nature and could not be rejected under § 365(a). 148
Although the Third Circuit focused on the "executoriness" of the
contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) and did not reference a licensee's
rights under § 365(n), Judge Ambrose's concurrence addressed
postrejection trademark rights.149 Because rejection was not the
functional equivalent of rescission, it did not require that parties be
returned to the positions they occupied before contracting.150 Judge
Ambrose determined that the legislative history of § 365(n) supported
use of the court's equitable powers to grant continued use over "fairly
procured trademark rights."15 1 Allowing licensees continued rights
140. Andrew, supra note 47, at 916.
141. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (providing an analogy to landlord-tenant law).
142. See id. (suggesting that if rights remain with the licensee, these rights may include
trademark rights).
143. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 964-68 (3rd Cir. 2010) (Ambro., J., concurring).
144. Id. at 961.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. ("The Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Exide's motion to reject the
Agreement.") (citing In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222, 250 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012); Exide, 607 F.3d at 964.
149. § 365(a), (n); Exide, 607 F.3d at 964-67.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40 (providing case law and scholarly opinions as
to the fundamental meaning of "rejection" under the Bankruptcy Code).
151. § 365(n); Exide, 607 F.3d at 967.
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postrejection would prevent a licensor from "tak[ing] back trademark
rights it bargained away." 152
In re Matusalem utilized an analysis resembling the Seventh
and Third Circuits' approach despite predating Sunbeam by nineteen
years. The Matusalem court determined that termination of the
franchisee-licensee's continued right to use the trademark would
"utterly destroy the business of [the licensee] and with it the livelihood
of [the licensee]'s principals and employees." 15 3 Though the court denied
the licensor's request to reject the agreement after finding that the
decision failed the business judgment test, the court still determined
that rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) would "not deprive [the licensee]
of its rights under the franchise agreement." 154
The Seventh and Third Circuits' approach offers several
advantages. First, it provides the most protection for licensees who
fairly bargain for the right to use the licensors' trademarks. 155 License
agreements are frequently the product of economic compromise s
between parties. In exchange for royalty payments, licensees typically
examine the relevant territorial market, the probability of success, and
the need for stipulations such as exclusivity. 156 Licensees consider all
such relevant factors and pursue a trademark license that, as a result
of such negotiation, enhances the wealth of both the licensor and
licensee. In many instances, at the time of the licensors' bankruptcy
filings, licensees have made substantial investments in reliance on the
continued licensing of intellectual property rights. 157 Because many
licensees' businesses are premised on the licensors' trademarks,
termination of the licensees' bargained-for rights risks destroying those
businesses. 15 8 The Seventh and Third Circuits' approach addresses this
risk by protecting licensees from bankrupt debtors seeking to use
rejection as a sword to reacquire rights that they bargained away.159
Second, allowing trademark licensees continued use of the
license postrejection prevents the chilling effect on the willingness of
parties to contract with businesses in tenuous financial
152. Exide, 607 F.3d at 967.
153. In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
154. Id.
155. Exide, 607 F.3d at 967.
156. See Menell, supra note 39, at 768 (describing negotiations between licensees and
licensors).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that
termination of the licensee's right to use the trademark would destroy the business).
159. See, supra note 118 and accompanying text for a discussion on the concept of using
bankruptcy as a "sword."
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circumstances.1 60 Licensees are more likely to enter license agreements
if they know that their rights to continue using the trademarks are
protected in a way akin to the protections granted to copyright and
patent licensees under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). The legislative history
of § 365(n) leaves the protection of trademark licensees an open
question. 161 Specifically, it suggests that Congress did not include
trademarks in the Code's definition of intellectual property because
more extensive study was needed. 162 Therefore, while it is true that
Congress explicitly omitted trademarks from the Code's definition of
intellectual property, it left open the possibility of future inclusion after
further research. Section 365(n) should likely include trademarks to
fully achieve Congress's intent in passage of the Intellectual Property
Licenses in Bankruptcy Act and the codification of 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 163
A natural criticism of the Seventh and Third Circuits' approach
is that it is judicial legislating. In enacting § 365(n), Congress explicitly
omitted trademarks, thus the inclusion of trademarks in the
Bankruptcy Code's definition of intellectual property goes against the
express will of Congress. 164 There is no ambiguity in the term
"intellectual property" in § 365(n). 165 Likewise, there is no ambiguity in
the definition of intellectual property in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 166
Section 101(35A) does not include the modifier "including but not
limited to" nor any language that would suggest that the list is not
exhaustive. 167 Under a strict textualist approach, omission in this
instance may require courts to apply Lubrizol; if protections for
trademark licensees should exist at all, it is Congress, not the courts,
that must provide them.168
160. See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th
Cir. 1985) ("Nor can it be doubted that allowing rejection in this and comparable cases could have
a general chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties to contract at all with businesses in
possible financial difficulty.").
161. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
162. Id.
163. Gilhuly et al., supra note 28, at 45 ("The exclusion of trademarks from the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of IP appears to be intentional."); Musone, supra note 53, at 512 (detailing how
Congress passed IPLBA with the express intent of reversing Lubrizol).
164. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3204, see In re Centura
Software Corp., 281 B.R. 660, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (suggesting that courts should not resort
to legislative history when the statute is unambiguous).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012).
166. See id. § 101(35A) (providing a list of "intellectual property").
167. See id.
168. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that the court in In re Centura used
a strict textualist argument).
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Yet, an analysis of the legislative history of § 365(n) counters
this criticism. 169 Although Congress explicitly omitted trademarks, it
did so only to provide for more "extensive study."17 0 A sufficient period
of study has likely passed, and trademark licensees deserve the same
protections granted to copyright and patent licensees. 171
Another criticism of this approach is that it harms the integrity
of trademarks rights. 172 Trademarks differ from other forms of
intellectual property because the trademark itself is inseparable from
the goodwill of the business. 173 Some scholars have argued that
trademark licenses fundamentally differ from other intellectual
property licenses because the licensor must continually preserve the
quality of the goods or services utilizing the licensor's mark. 174 Such
maintenance of the brand's integrity ensures that the public is not
misled. 175 Thus, some scholars believe that the Seventh Circuit
wrongfully characterized a trademark license as merely a conveyance
of a property right, in which the licensor receives a reversionary interest
to redeem upon expiration or termination of the license.176 These
scholars view a trademark license as an active relationship between the
licensor and licensee that is necessary to maintain the validity of the
trademark.177 Rejection of the license in bankruptcy severs the
relationship between licensor and licensee, and the licensor no longer
has the obligation nor the ability to ensure quality control over the
mark. 178 The quality of the trademarked product is no longer subject to
quality regulations because specific performance by the debtor-licensor
169. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3204.
170. Id.
171. For example, Sunbeam provides a reasoned analysis for why excluding trademark
licensees protections while granting those same protections to patent and copyright licensees
makes little sense. Infra Part IV.B.
172. See generally Wilton & Devore, supra note 74 (suggesting that the Seventh Circuit's
concept ofatrademark right as a property conveyance with areversionary interest jeopardizes the
integrity of trademark rights).
173. See id. at 774 (asserting that goodwill and the company's trademark symbol are
inseparable).
174. Id. at 773 ("In short a trademark license in a franchise agreement is almost entirely
about coordinating the relationship of the licensor and licensee so that the trademark symbol is
protected and linked strongly with the goodwill generated by the efforts of a diverse universe of
franchisees.").
175. Id.
176. See id. at 772.
177. Id. at 780.
178. See id. at 774 (suggesting that the Sunbeam decision "has mandated emergency surgery
for all trademark licenses rejected in bankruptcy, surgery that will separate trademark symbols
from the goodwill created by the licensees of the marks and destroy both the trademark and
associated goodwill").
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is prohibited under the Bankruptcy Code.179 Under the Seventh
Circuit's approach, licensees would be free to use a brand denoted by a
mark without any quality control by the franchisor, potentially leading
to the diminution of the trademark's integrity.180
However, slippery slope arguments over trademark integrity
may be exaggerated. Because the vitality of a licensee's business often
hinges on the continued quality of the trademark, licensees have little
incentive to diverge from quality control guidelines set by the licensor.
A licensee will likely maintain the integrity of the trademarked goods
or services to avoid alienating its consumer base. 181 Licensors also seek
to avoid naked licenses because failure to ensure quality control may
support a court's finding that the trademark owner has abandoned the
trademark. 182 If a court determines that the licensor has abandoned the
trademark, the licensor may no longer assert rights to the mark. 183
Other scholars criticize the Seventh Circuit's analogy to real
property as an invalid comparison under § 365.184 To support its holding
in Sunbeam, the court analogized a trademark license to a real property
lease, suggesting that rejection would not abrogate the lease of real
property and therefore should not abrogate a license to intellectual
property. 185 However, this analogy falters upon closer look. Congress
explicitly addressed the rights of lessees upon rejection of a real
property lease by a lessor in 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). 186 This demonstrates
179. Id. at 780 ("The ability of a licensee to retain rights to use trademarks following rejection
of the license in bankruptcy requires specific performance of a debtor-licensor's obligation to
maintain quality control of trademarked products or services, a remedy that is prohibited under
the Bankruptcy Code.").
180. Id. at 774.
181. In the event of a licensor's bankruptcy, a licensee whose business depends on the
licensor's trademark will likely not suddenly diminish the quality of its products. Natural
incentives exist for the licensee to continue production of goods with the same quality or risk
alienating the licensee's consumer base. Oftentimes a licensee's business hinges on the same
clients as the licensor's business. What hurts one likely hurts the other.
182. Gordon, supra note 31, at 837.
183. Id.
184. See generally Wilton & Devore, supra note 74, at 746 (suggesting throughout that the
analogy used by the Seventh Circuit is inapt and reflects a mistaken reading of § 365).
185. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012):
[A] lessee that enters bankruptcy may reject the lease and pay damages for abandoning
the premises, but rejection does not abrogate the lease (which would absolve the debtor
of the need to pay damages). Similarly a lessor that enters bankruptcy could not, by
rejecting the lease, end the tenant's right to possession and thus re-acquire premises
that might be rented out for a higher price.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012) (providing for instances in which a trustee rejects an unexpired
lease of real property, suggesting that the lessee may retain its rights under such a lease, including
rights of possession, quiet enjoyment, etc., to the extent that such rights are enforceable under
applicable nonbankruptcy law).
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that Congress likely intended to distinguish between real property and
intellectual property rights postrejection, granting additional
protections only to the former.187 By applying the § 365(h) exception for
real property lessees, the Bankruptcy Code suggests that unstated
exceptions should not be implied under a theory of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.188
IV. SOLUTION: APPLYING THE SEVENTH AND THIRD CIRCUITS'
APPROACH WITH THE ADDED STIPULATION THAT LICENSEES 1VIAINTAIN
QUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS AFTER REJECTION
In deciding how to resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court
should adopt the approach taken by the Seventh and Third Circuits
with the additional requirement that trademark licensees postrejection
must maintain the quality control requirements inherent in the
trademark license.
A. Trademarks Are Intellectual Property and Should Be Included
Under the Definition of Intellectual Property in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)
The overwhelming weight of scholarship suggests that
trademark rights belong in the protected class of intellectual property
described in 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 189 Because Congress did not fully
address the issue, leaving it open for experimentation, the time is ripe
for the definitive inclusion of trademark rights under § 365(n). 190
Trademarks are a natural subgroup of intellectual property. 191
Trademarks, patents, and copyrights are the principal three subgroups
of intellectual property law. 192 Intellectual property is defined in
academic scholarship as "a category of intangible rights protecting
commercially valuable products of the human intellect." 193 Trademarks
meet this criterion for classification as intellectual property. Although
187. Wilton & Devore, supra note 74, at 774 ("Statutory protections for tenants under real
estate leases have been in place for seventy-five years . . .while no similar protections have ever
existed for trademark licensees.").
188. Id.
189. See generally Agin, supra note 44 (suggesting that trademark licensees should be
protected under 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)); Lieb, supra note 111 (describing the three key components of
intellectual property law, patents, trademarks, and copyrights); Nguyen, supra note 118
(suggesting that trademarks are a fundamental part ofintellectual property).
190. See supra text accompanying note 59-64 (suggesting that the legislative history
of § 365(n) leaves the door open for inclusion of trademark rights in the future).
191. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 125, at 1458.
192. Id.
193. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 824 (9th ed. 2009).
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the economic foundations for patent and copyright protections differ
from that of trademark law, all three protect investments in research
and development and product quality. 194 Thus, the adoption of the
Seventh and Third Circuits' approach conforms to generally accepted
notions of "intellectual property" by extending 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)'s
protections to trademark licensees. Ultimately, pressure should be
placed on Congress to amend 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) of the Bankruptcy
Code to include trademarks in the definition of intellectual property.
B. Quality Control: Attaining the Benefits of the Seventh and Third
Circuits' Approach Without the Weaknesses
This solution has the same benefits as adopting the Seventh and
Third Circuits' approach without some of the weaknesses. Granting
licensees continued use of trademarks postrejection protects licensees
from debtor-licensors who attempt to use rejection as a sword to
unfairly take back trademark rights that they freely bargained away. 195
Further, under this approach, potential trademark licensees no longer
experience the chilling effect and can confidently enter into license
agreements with licensors in tenuous financial circumstances. 196
The primary argument against the Seventh and Third Circuits'
approach is that allowing trademark licensees to continue to use
trademarks postrejection jeopardizes the integrity of trademark
licenses. 197 The fear is that under this approach the trademark license
becomes a naked license, free from the quality control stipulations
enforced by the licensor. 198 Because quality control protects the average
consumer from confusion and deceit, the Seventh and Third Circuits'
approach may harm consumers. 199
This solution proposes retention of quality control standards,
which alleviates the concern that losing quality control requirements
could diminish the quality of goods produced. However, licensees have
natural incentives to maintain quality standards even without a
194. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 125, at 1059 ("Despite the different economic
and legal theories underlying them, however, we contend that both patents and trademarks allow
firms to appropriate the benefits of investment in Research and Development ("R&D") and product
quality.").
195. See generally cases and authorities cited supra note 111 (discussing the weaknesses of
the Sunbeam approach).
196. See generally cases and authorities cited supra note 59 (describing the chilling effect that
Lubrizol had on the willingness of parties to contract).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 172-80.
198. Nguyen, supra note 118, at 1311-12 (suggesting that a trademark license often requires
a licensor's quality control provision in order to avoid a naked license).
199. Id. at 1314.
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judicially created obligation. In many instances, a licensee has spent
substantial resources building the goodwill of the trademark in the
assigned territory or location. 200 Because the licensee's success depends
on the integrity of the trademark, the licensee is unlikely to destroy the
goodwill of the trademark by selling goods or products of materially
different quality.201
While these natural incentives do allay some fears about the
total collapse of quality control after the rejection of a trademark license
agreement in bankruptcy, they are not sufficient to protect consumers
and the integrity of the mark. This Note's proposed solution resolves
the issue of diminished trademark integrity by formally requiring
licensees to take the specific actions that they should be economically
motivated to pursue in the first place. By affirmatively requiring
licensees to maintain the quality control standards stated in the
original licensing agreement for the duration of the license's life, this
approach actively prevents degradation of trademark integrity. 202
By pushing courts to require that postrejection trademark
licensees maintain the trademark's integrity, this solution mitigates
fears that the Sunbeam approach will lead to naked licenses and result
in consumer harm. Moreover, implementing this solution would not be
unduly burdensome; most trademark licenses include the licensor's
quality control requirements in a "quality standard provision."203
Because licensors rarely visit a licensee's business location to verify the
quality of products or services, they rely on licensees to abide by the
contract's quality assurance terms. 2 0 4 The quality standard provision is
now the norm in trademark licensing because of its low cost to both
licensors and licensees. Judicial enforcement of this provision is also a
low-cost remedy, since the Bankruptcy Code prevents requiring the
debtor-licensor to continue quality control duties. 205 Rather than forcing
individual licensors to affirmatively ensure the continued quality of
products associated with their licensed marks-a costly endeavor-the
duty would flow naturally from the rejection of a trademark licensing
200. Id. at 1310.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1314. Nguyen postulates that the imposition of quality-control standards upon
licensees willprotect the consumer by maintaining the quality control standard for the goods under
the licensed trademarks, even if the licensor rejects the trademark license agreement. Id.
Consequently, the goodwill of the trademark will not be destroyed as the licensee continues to
adhere to the existing quality control obligation. Id.
203. Id. at 1311.
204. Id.
205. See id. (suggesting that the license provides the structure for maintaining the agreed
upon level of quality).
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agreement in bankruptcy. This solution acts as an incentive for
licensors to include quality control standards within the original
agreement and further protects the public from divergences in the
quality of goods produced by different licensees. In this regard,
consumers, licensors, and additional licensees will be protected from
deviations in the quality of goods or services that might jeopardize the
integrity of the trademark once a trademark license is rejected in
bankruptcy.
V. CONCLUSION
Legal scholarship classifies trademarks as a form of intellectual
property. However, trademark law differs from copyright and patent
law in a few respects. While patent and copyright law aim to encourage
innovation and creativity through rewarding exclusivity, trademark
law functions to preserve goodwill and reputation among consumers.
The differences between these subcategories of intellectual property
may have influenced Congress's decision to initially omit trademarks
from the definition of intellectual property in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A).
As a result, courts have split over whether trademarks should
be included in spite of the omission. The recent Sunbeam decision relies
upon theoretical interpretations of the meaning of rejection under an
executory contract in bankruptcy, finding that rejection is not the
equivalent to a rescission of the license. The overwhelming weight of
scholarship supports this interpretation of rejection under the
Bankruptcy Code. When a debtor-licensor rejects a contract, the
licensor breaches the license agreement. However, because one party's
breach does not diminish the other party's contractual rights, a
trademark licensee's continued rights to use the trademark persist after
rejection.
The greatest drawback of granting licensees continued use of
trademarks postrejection is the potential sacrifice of trademark
integrity if licensors stop enforcing quality control. A licensee's natural
incentives to maintain quality control alleviate a portion of these fears,
even if the court does not impose an affirmative duty to sustain quality.
In many instances, a licensee's livelihood depends on the continued
viability of the license, and a reduction in the quality of the products or
services bearing the licensed mark is just as detrimental to the
licensee's business as it is to the licensor's business. Supplementing
these natural incentives, the proposed solution remedies those fears by
affirmatively requiring that licensees maintain the quality control
specifications contained in their license agreements before the license s
were rejected in bankruptcy. This solution addresses the criticism of the
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Seventh and Third Circuits' approach while maintaining all of its
benefits. Regardless, Congress should directly address the circuit split
through updating the legislation to include trademark licensees in the
protections provided by 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
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